MANAGING YIELD RISK THROUGH A COOPERATIVE by Zeuli, Kimberly A. & Skees, Jerry R.








University of Kentucky 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Room 309 Agricultural Engineering Building 
Lexington, KY 40546-0276 
 
Phone: (859) 257-7283 






H.B. Price Professor  
University of Kentucky 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Room 310 Agricultural Engineering Building 





American Agricultural Economics Association 2001 Annual Meeting 
 
 
Copyright 2001 by Kimberly Zeuli and Jerry Skees. All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   1 
Introduction 
 
  Recent legislative changes have increased the emphasis on agricultural risk 
management and new product development. The most recent legislation increased federal 
crop insurance subsidies to 59% for certain coverage levels. As a result of such subsidies, 
crop and revenue insurance use has increased dramatically in the past ten years.  Some 
crops have participation that exceeds 80 percent of the eligible acres.  The cost to the 
taxpayer for subsidized crop and revenue insurance has more than doubled in the past few 
years: from an expected cost of $1.5 billion in 1995 to over $3.0 billion today.  Further, 
policymakers are now stating that every significant agriculture commodity will be 
eligible for some form of federally subsidized crop insurance in the near future.  This will 
clearly neither be an easy nor low-cost objective to obtain.  
Among the more salient challenges the federal crop insurance program faces is 
designing products that achieve equitable risk management for all producers at relatively 
low cost to the taxpayer. This issue is a particular problem for many of the specialty 
crops, as they are the most difficult to insure.  For example, within this category of 
commodities, yield risk is often more related to management than to uncontrolled factors 
such as weather. Thus, the likelihood of moral hazard and adverse selection is greatly 
increased, creating conditions where the benefits of the insurance program could be 
greatly skewed toward growers who are poor managers. Controlling adverse selection 
and moral hazard requires substantial farm-level information and monitoring, which is 
often costly to obtain. Additionally, creating a new crop insurance program usually   2 
requires substantial farm-level historic yield data, which is often difficult and costly to 
obtain for specialty crops. 
This paper investigates a new delivery mechanism for an alternative insurance 
product designed to manage vegetable yield risk. The combination should be more cost 
effective to both producers and taxpayers while also being more successful at managing 
yield risk. In particular, the use of an area yield insurance mechanism by a vegetable 
cooperative is analyzed. Hypothetically, this structure protects the throughput risk for the 
cooperative. It also creates a type of reinsurance that allows the cooperative to become a 
mutual insurer, offering farmers individual yield insurance. 
Background on Crop Insurance 
To understand why programs offering more efficient crop insurance are needed, it 
is necessary to discuss the inefficiencies of the current crop insurance program. Crop 
insurance is sold to individual farmers as protection against lower than average yields 
(farmers can of course also purchase catastrophic coverage to protect against damage 
from extreme weather events as hail and flood, but that type of protection is not the focus 
of this discussion).  An average farm yield is calculated from the producer’s Actual 
Production History (APH), 4 to 10 years of yield data. Yield levels can now be insured 
for up to 85 percent of that average. Further, farmers can obtain different crop insurance 
policies on the same crop by subdividing their farms into enterprise units.  This offers 
opportunities to increase the whole farm coverage level.   
   3 
Benefits for crop insurance have been skewed for some time. Glauber, Harwood, 
and Skees found that a small percentage of policies collect a significant portion of the 
losses. For example, only 1.4 percent of the soybean policies collected 41.3 percent of 
excess losses during the period 1983-90.  Much of these inequities were a result of 
serious adverse selection and moral hazard during this time period. Farmers always know 
more about their yield potential and risk than anyone from the outside (either the 
government or a private insurer).  Such asymmetric information creates the dual 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.   
Adverse selection occurs when there are problems in classifying the risk of 
potential purchasers. In the federal crop insurance program, farmers are required to have 
records to back up their reported historic yields.  It is not uncommon for them or the 
agents who sell to them to conveniently “lose” some historical yields to make the offer 
yield higher.  Further, as few as four years of records can be used to set the average yield 
for the contract.  Obviously, significant measurement error can exist with such a limited 
number of observations.  Thus, the program creates an environment that fosters an 
unbiased selection of producers; producers with the highest risk will be the most 
motivated to purchase the insurance. Moral hazard arises when farmers who are insured 
change their behavior in ways that increase the chances of loss beyond the insurance 
contract terms.  For example, farmers may provide their APH from acreage with good 
soil and then also plant more marginal acreage once they purchase insurance.  
 
   4 
Because of rating reforms instituted in the early 1990s, such abuse is considerably 
less of a problem today. However, the unbalanced nature of the benefits remains a 
problem and some fraud also exists because it is not difficult to misrepresent realized 
yields. Adding subsidies may bring lower risk farmers into the risk pool and ease some of 
the actuarial problems. Yet, those who have been abusing the program will remain the 
primary beneficiaries of more subsidies. Controlling adverse selection and moral hazard 
requires more reliable farm-level information.  Obtaining such information is costly, 
especially with commodities grown on small acreage (i.e., vegetables) or grown by a few 
farmers in a particular area. Information costs will also be greater when a new crop is 
being insured; one that does not have yield data previously collected and organized into 
databases.   
  The federal crop insurance program is a public-private partnership where private 
companies sell and service crop insurance and also share in the risk.  Private companies 
are reimbursed for selling and servicing policies to farmers at 24.5 percent of 
unsubsidized premiums. In other words, for every $100 premium sold, the insurance 
company receives $24.50 from taxpayers to cover delivery expenses. The percentage is 
fixed by statute and bears little relationship to the actual costs faced by companies.  
While the aggregate national cost to crop insurance companies may be close to the fixed 
percentage, the costs of selling and servicing crop insurance vary greatly from one area of 
the country to the other. Some companies may be getting reimbursed for costs they have 
not actually borne. Further, the fixed percentage means that companies are often   5 
unwilling to bear the extra costs associated with obtaining sufficient farm-level 
information. Clearly there is an incentive for companies to minimize their expenses.  
Using Agricultural Cooperatives to Deliver Federal Crop Insurance 
  The use of agricultural cooperatives, instead of private insurance 
companies, to deliver federal crop insurance could help diminish some of the 
inefficiencies discussed above. As outlined in Black, Barnett, and Hu, the cooperative 
could develop an index that reflects yield levels for the entire membership or an 
appropriate sub-group (distinguished by geography and/or commodity). The government 
could then sell the cooperative an area-yield insurance product structured like the Group 
Risk Plan (Skees, Black, and Barnett). However, rather than paying for yield losses 
triggered by county yield levels, the government would make payments for losses 
triggered by index yield levels. The index accounts for the systemic risk, leaving only the 
independent, basis risk of individual grower-members. The cooperative could thus act 
like a mutual insurer that handles basis risk and offer some wrap-around-insurance 
protection to individual members (Zeuli and Skees). The farmer-members would thus be 
completely covered: (1) the area yield insurance policy would cover systemic losses; and 
(2) tailored products offered by the co-op would cover any residual losses the individual 
may suffer independently of the group.  
This scheme could offer several advantages over the current federal crop 
insurance program, especially for new specialty crops. First, it should increase the cost 
efficiency of crop insurance delivery. Since cooperatives typically keep yield records of 
their members, fairly reliable APH data should be easily (and at relatively no cost)   6 
obtained. Second, moral hazard and adverse selection should be diminished. Since the 
growers collectively own the cooperative, and share annual profits, they will have less 
incentive to abuse the insurance program. They will also have more incentive to monitor 
other members, to ensure others do not abuse the system.  
An Empirical Example  
  To illustrate the concepts and potential benefits of this cooperative insurance 
scheme, data was gathered from a central Kentucky vegetable marketing cooperative. 
The cooperative, established in 1969, currently handles four types of vegetables: cabbage, 
tomatoes, green peppers and red peppers (it recently added pumpkins, but that represents 
a small percentage of revenues and thus will be ignored). It has 176 members growing 
products on a combined 493 acres in 10-15 counties. Most members, however, farm in 
one of four counties. The cooperative has two receiving and packing plants in Kentucky, 
representing two primary geographical areas. For simplicity, and anonymity, these two 
areas will be referred to as north and south. Yield, acreage, and revenue data (aggregate 
and split among the two plants) from 1974-2000 was obtained for the four commodities. 
Individual farm level data was obtained for the years 1990-2000.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate trends in yield per acre for tomatoes and cabbage based 
on the aggregate cooperative data. Yields were detrended using the following formula: 
(1.0) Detrended yield = (actual yield / trend yield ) * 2000 trend yield 
An area yield contract was constructed with a strike or trigger yield set at 90 
percent of the expected trended yield. As explained in Skees, Black and Barnett, this type   7 
of contract pays on a proportional basis.  The yield shortfall percentage is a 
straightforward calculation: 
  (2.0) Yield shortfall percentage = (trigger yield – actual yield) / trigger yield 
If the actual, or realized yield, exceeds the trigger yield, no payment would be made to 
the farmer. The yield shortfall percentage series is presented in table 1.  It is noteworthy 
that the vegetable yields are generally not correlated (a product of diverse agronomic 
needs).  Nonetheless, a few years stand out as being poor for all crops.  For example, in 
1983, all vegetables had yields below the trigger yield. A similar pattern is reflected in 
1988 and 1998; all three were drought years.  
  Premium rates can be calculated from the trended yield data by simply creating a 
series of trigger yields (given expected yields) and making the percentage calculations for 
each year in the series. The simple average of the series of yield shortfall percentages 
gives the pure premium rate for the time period: 
  (3.0) Pure premium rate = sum of yield shortfall percentages / number of years 
Actual premiums paid would be determined by the cash value of the liability that is 
selected (Miranda; Skees, Black and Barnett):  
  (4.0) Premium payment = pure premium rate * liability 
Indemnity payments are the product of liability and yield shortfall percentage: 
(5.0) Indemnity payment = liability * yield shortfall percentage 
 
Over recent years, the prices paid to cooperative members have been relatively 
stable.  Thus, the price level for each commodity is a fixed average of the past three   8 
years, as reported in table 2.  The acreage is also fixed using the average of the past three 
years.  Yields in table 2 reflect the trended yields from 1974-2000.  The relative share of 
the total cooperative’s revenue each commodity holds is also presented in table 2. 
Tomatoes are the greatest revenue source, followed by red peppers, cabbage, and green 
peppers. 
  Using the detrended yields and fixed average acreage and price data (reported in 
table 2), a revenue series was calculated for 1974-2000.  A comparison of the relative risk 
with an area yield insurance contract and without such a contract was then developed.  A 
time series of revenue with insurance was calculated by taking the revenue without 
insurance, subtracting premium payments and then adding indemnity payments for each 
year.  Since a pure premium rate is assumed, on average the revenue with and without 
insurance will be equal. The variance or standard deviation, however, will be lower with 
the insurance. To normalize the risk and allow one to make comparisons, the coefficient 
of variation is used.  
  As shown in table 3, the relative risk for tomatoes decreases from 18.3% without 
insurance to 11.1% with insurance, a 39% reduction.  When the total crop mix is 
evaluated, the relative risk (15.3%) is much lower than any single crop’s relative risk.  If 
each of the commodities had area yield policy coverage, then the total crop mix relative 
risk drops to 9.8%.  As shown in figure 3, revenue variance also clearly (although not 
substantially) decreases with area insurance.  
If the co-op could obtain more disaggregate area yield insurance for sub groups of 
growers, for example for each group of members delivering to the two receiving plants   9 
(north and south), the relative risk decline with insurance would be even greater. It is a 
common statistical property that variance of yields will decline as yields are aggregated.  
Thus, disaggregating the groups of farmers will increase variance and relative yield risk.  
This also means higher premiums for the same coverage levels (90% coverage for our 
examples).  Since premium subsidies are set as a percent of total premium, there are 
subsidy advantages to disaggregating the groups to the extent practical.  
Conclusion 
The results of this analysis suggest that producers of specialty crops could benefit 
from an insurance program that offers area-yield insurance through a farmer-owned 
cooperative. Taxpayers would also benefit from the lower cost. The insurance contract 
would be more transparent, more accessible, and less likely to be subject to moral hazard 
and adverse selection than traditional crop insurance programs. Clearly, however, more 
analysis needs to be done. The next step is to analyze farm-level yields and benefits from 
a slightly more complicated scheme that involves some additional wrap-around-insurance 
product delivered by the cooperative.  10 
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Table 1. Cooperative Yield Shortfall Percentages by Year 





1974 1% 22%  1%  0% 
1975 0% 0%  5%  0% 
1976 0% 0%  0%  0% 
1977 5% 0%  12%  31% 
1978 0% 33%  0%  0% 
1979 0% 0%  0%  0% 
1980 0% 0%  38%  20% 
1981 17% 0%  0%  6% 
1982 0% 0%  0%  0% 
1983 49% 15%  26%  26% 
1984 6% 0%  0%  0% 
1985 0% 0%  0%  0% 
1986 0% 23%  0%  0% 
1987 0% 0%  41%  51% 
1988 30% 0%  71%  7% 
1989 0% 0%  3%  19% 
1990 0% 0%  1%  0% 
1991 19% 0%  0%  0% 
1992 0% 0%  10%  19% 
1993 0% 0%  0%  21% 
1994 0% 0%  0%  0% 
1995 0% 27%  0%  35% 
1996 0% 0%  36%  0% 
1997 0% 0%  62%  0% 
1998 32% 5%  0%  22% 
1999 0% 0%  35%  14% 
2000 0% 0%  0%  0% 
Pure 
Premium  5.9% 4.6%  12.6%  10.0% 
 
 
Table 2: Cooperative Commodity Portfolio 
   Acres  Price  Yield  Revenue  Share 
Tomato  92  $   0.234  26,640  $ 573,506  57% 
Cabbage  77  $   0.048  32,000  $ 118,272  12% 
G. Pepper  36  $   0.209  11,140  $   83,817  8% 
R. Pepper  151  $   0.135  11,450  $ 233,408  23%   13 
 
Table 3. Relative Risk by Crop 

















Tomato  $577,343  $105,692  18.3%  $64,360  11.1% 
Cabbage  $118,174  $28,647  24.2%  $19,589  16.6% 
G. Pepper  $84,106  $34,289  40.8%  $23,159  27.5% 
R. Pepper  $237,019  $82,139  34.7%  $60,269  25.4% 
Total Mix  $1,016,642 $155,412  15.3%  $99,668  9.8% 
a.  “W/O” denotes without area-yield insurance. 


































Figure 3. Revenues With and Without Area-Yield Insurance 